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"Chinese Navy Threatens Asia"
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http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/8/13/221644.shtml
Chinese Navy Threatens Asia=20
Alexandr Nemets and Thomas Torda
Tuesday, Aug. 14, 2001=20
One would think, after the successful bid by the People=92s Republic of =
China for the 2008 Olympics, that the world has at least seven peaceful =
years ahead. However, this is quite doubtful.=20
>From May to July, tens of thousands of People=92s Liberation Army (PLA) =
troops engaged in large-scale, high-tech maneuvers on and near Dongshan =
Island, just off the coast of Fujian Province =96 maneuvers aimed at =
practicing for an amphibious operation against Taiwan.=20
On Aug. 11, 2001, the PLA entered a second stage of these maneuvers, =
considered the largest military exercises ever held in the PRC=92s =
52-year history. The announced aim of this new stage is to "simulate=94 =
an invasion of the Taiwan-controlled Penghu Islands (Pescadores), =
halfway between the Fujian coast and Taiwan, as the first stage of a =
major operation again Taiwan.=20
These war games involve at least 100,000 elite PLA troops from units in =
Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong Provinces; hundreds of fighters; dozens =
of naval vessels; and a good number of air defense and 2nd Artillery =
(Strategic Missile Troops) units.=20
The PLA=92s best troops, equipped with the nation=92s best ordnance and =
concentrated less than 100 miles from Taiwan, are under the command of =
some 300 high-ranking officers presiding over the maneuvers. The scale =
of these maneuvers clearly indicates that they are not routine, but =
rather a dress rehearsal for an attack on Taiwan.=20
This demonstration of Chinese military power came as Chinese President =
and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin cautioned the =
U.S. that arms sales to Taiwan were "utterly wrong" and "would be very =
dangerous,=94 adding that the PRC "can never renounce the use of force =
against Taiwan."=20
In a closed CMC meeting on Aug. 1, the PLA=92s 74th anniversary, Jiang =
used much stronger words in regard to the U.S. and Taiwan. Still, many =
China watchers, including U.S. defense experts, consider all this =
activity as mere saber-rattling aimed at intimidation of Taiwan, and =
unsupported by real military capabilities. These experts love to point =
out the weakness and aging warships of the PLA Navy (PLAN).=20
'093 Project' Attack Nuclear Submarine=20
In late July, the two authors, while compiling a new book, "The =
Russian-Chinese Alliance" (to be published in September by NewsMax.com), =
wrote the following in regard to Chinese attack nuclear submarines =
(SSNs):=20
"As for SSNs =96 a critical area, since China=92s five Han-class =
submarines are aging and considered obsolete =96 the Huludao Shipyard =
has been working on the "093 Project=94 SSN since 1996-97, with =
technology completely supplied by the St. Petersburg-based Rubin Design =
Bureau. In summer 1999, the first 093 submarine was launched, and in =
2000 Taiwan sources revealed that the new submarine could be equipped =
with several Hongniao 3 (HN-3) land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), =
similar to Russia=92s Granat/SS-N-21 model. The Chinese acquired =
technology for the Granat LACM, developed in the 1980s by =
Yekaterinburg-based Novator Design Bureau, in 1996-98. The Granat, which =
can carry a nuclear warhead, has a range of 2500-3000 km, and although =
subsonic, it is a sea-skimming type, very difficult to shoot down.=20
"On 19 July 2001, just 3 days after the signing of the Sino-Russian Good =
Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, a Moscow newspaper =
wrote that China is negotiating to buy the Granat, now deployed on Oscar =
II (Kursk-type) SSNs. There are two nearly completed Oscar II subs =
docked at the 'Sevmash' Shipyard in Severodvinsk, and would not cost =
Russian industry much to complete. China could easily have these subs =
for $2 billion, and this goes for other unfinished Russian SSNs at =
Komsomolsk-na-Amure Shipyard.=20
"By late 2002 PLAN will have at least one type 093 SSN built in China =
and at least one similar submarine built in Russia for China. How many =
Granat LACMs they carry is unknown.=94=20
Only days later, one of the authors found in the authoritative Taiwan =
journal Chung-Kung Yen-chiu (PRC Research) (No. 2, 2001), in an article =
on the PLA in 2000, the following statement: "The PLA is engaged in =
construction of the =91093 project=92 attack nuclear submarines, =
equipped with 1600-km-range cruise missiles=85. [By the end of 2000] one =
or two such submarines were already placed in service.=94=20
The authors thought that they were making bold statements in their book. =
However, as often happens, Chinese reality can surpass the boldest =
estimates, and the authors have upgraded their forecast as follows: "By =
late 2002 PLAN will have in service at least two =91093 Project=92 SSNs =
built in China and 1-2 even more advanced SSNs built in Russia for =
China. At least one of them could be equipped with Granat/SS-N-21 cruise =
missiles with a range of 2500 km or more.=94 Of course, some may doubt =
the authenticity of this report. Still, this information is trustworthy =
enough. Indeed, the first "093 Project=94 SSN was launched in mid-1999, =
and the Rubin Design Bureau staff did its best to complete equipping of =
this ship by late 1999. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself visited =
this bureau on 23 December 1999 and spent several hours there. At that =
time, PLAN was a major =96 if not the only =96 customer of Rubin.=20
An added comment: attempts to look at official lists of PLA weaponry as =
published in The Military Balance and other mainstream defense =
references and Web sites for the latest data will prove fruitless. The =
PLA is quite good at hiding its best armaments, and these references =96 =
while quite adequate for gauging the overall size and shape of PLAN =96 =
are usually out of date by the time they land on the readers=92 desks.=20
'094 Project' Strategic Missile Submarine=20
Let us go to another quotation from our book, this time in regards to =
China=92s strategic-missile submarines (SSBNs):=20
"It was initially thought that by 2003 PLAN would get one =
Russian-technology-based =91094 Project=92 SSBN. However, Christmas Day =
2000 reports from several East Asian sources indicate that on 15 =
December China test-fired new SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic =
missiles) from nuclear submarines in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea. =
CMC Deputy Chairman Gen. Zhang Wannian said that PLAN=92s first two =
test-launches of MIRVed missiles from submarines were conducted =
simultaneously, and that the DF-31-II missiles successfully hit a dummy =
military-base target in the Taklamakan Desert of western China's =
Xinjiang Province. The 10,000-km-range DF-31-II is said to be able to =
attack five targets at once with a circular error probable (CEP) of 5 =
meters, although this claim sounds exaggerated.=20
"An even more startling report issued on 2-3 July 2001 by Hong Kong and =
Taiwan sources stated that =91Beijing insiders=92 had said that on 28 =
June, three type 094 SSBNs, stationed respectively in the South China =
Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea, had simultaneously launched =
=91JL-21A=92 SLBMs that precisely hit their target, 5000 km away in the =
Taklamakan Desert. The report said that China=92s top leaders =96 =
President Jiang, Premier Zhu Rongji, Vice President Hu Jintao, Defense =
Minister Gen. Chi Haotian, and Gen. Zhang =96 observed this launch from =
a special command and control room in CMC Headquarters. The report added =
that the JL-21A could hold 6-8 MIRVed warheads, and that the U.S. =
intelligence community in March 2001 had predicted that the PLA will be =
capable of launching JL-21A SLBMs no earlier than 2005.=20
"The Beijing insiders also said that this triple launch of a JL-21A =96 =
characterized by small size, destructive power, and high precision (15-m =
CEP) =96 was a Chinese response to the U.S. NMD project, and that the =
PLA by 2005 intends to field six SSBNs, including type-094=92s, each =
equipped with 12 JL-21A missiles (italics added). These SLBMs would =
complement a significant number of rail-mobile and road-mobile IRBMs and =
ICBMs to be deployed by 2005.=20
"Several major questions arise. How many =91094 Project=92 SSBNs did the =
PLA have by mid-2001? How many of them will be in service by late 2002? =
Exactly how many SLBMs and warheads will each such SSBN have? And what =
is the role of Russia? The authors know that China could not accomplish =
these test-launches without heavy assistance from the Krasnoyarsk =
Machine Building Plant (the only Russian maker of SLBMs), as well as =
from Russian designers and builders of SSBNs in Severodvinsk (on the =
White Sea) and St. Petersburg. Finally, what of the early-September 1999 =
reports that Russia would sell China two old Typhoon-class SSBNs? =
Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are very unclear. =
Obviously, this project(s) is much more dangerous than PLA projects in =
ICBMs and air-launched strategic LACMs combined.=94=20
No new data is available on the type 094 submarine. However, as =
mentioned above, Chinese reality often surpasses the boldest estimates, =
and we forecast that by late 2002 PLAN likely will have at least two =
=91094 Project=92 SSBNs in service. Nor can it be excluded that some =
"written off=94 and mothballed Russian Typhoon-class SSBNs will be =
refitted for sale to the PRC.=20
New-generation Guided Missile Destroyers=20
In December 1999 and November 2000, PLAN respectively acquired from St. =
Petersburg=92s Severnyy Verf (Northern Wharf) its first and second =
Sovremennyy-class destroyers (now renamed the Hangzhou and Fuzhou, =
respectively) equipped with 200-km-range supersonic Moskit (SS-N-22, =
NATO "Sunburn=94) anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). One such destroyer =
can simultaneously launch 8 ASCMs, each of which could take out a U.S. =
Navy Aegis-type destroyer, and three of which can disable a U.S. =
aircraft carrier. What is most unpleasant, by mid-2001 the U.S. Navy =
still had no weapon capable of effectively stopping this ASCM. This =
missile appears to be an ideal weapon against any U.S. Navy intervention =
in a Taiwan conflict.=20
As confirmed at the February 2001 session of the Sino-Russian Commission =
on Military-Technological Cooperation in Moscow, China has placed orders =
for six more Sovremennyy destroyers. It would take a long time to build =
these 8500-ton destroyers from scratch and install all the needed =
equipment; but the Russian Navy by early 2000 had mothballed 10 =
Sovremennyy destroyers for lack of funds. More critically, Russia=92s =
Ministry of Defense has formed a commission charged with repairing these =
10 destroyers, upgrading them up to the maximum degree, and selling them =
=96 either to China or India.=20
In October 2000, the Russian side agreed in principle to upgrade two =
used Sovremennyy-class destroyers at one of the St. Petersburg shipyards =
and transfer them to China. Evidently, by February 2001, the Chinese =
order had expanded to six used destroyers of this class.=20
By late 2002, China could acquire two or three more such destroyers, =
probably equipped with even more deadly Yakhont supersonic ASCMs. The =
Raduga Design Bureau in Dubna (150 km north of Moscow) had developed the =
Moskit missiles in 1980s, and NPO Mashinostroyeniye in Reutov (a Moscow =
suburb) outdid Raduga by its 1990s development of the Yakhont ASCM, with =
greater speed and a 300-km range. The Yakhont, which by late 2000 had =
become available for export, remarkably is smaller than the Moskit and =
uses a compact, 16-tube vertical launch system. How many supersonic =
ASCMs could be launched at once by China=92s Sovremennyy destroyers by =
late 2002? Fifty, 60, or more?=20
In 1999, PLAN commissioned the new-generation Luhai-class guided missile =
destroyer, built by Dalian Shipyard in northeast China. By late 2002 =
PLAN will have at least two more such vessels, inferior to the =
Sovremennyy warships but incorporating advanced Russian technology, =
reportedly including Yakhont supersonic ASCMs. China has also begun =
building the new-generation Luyang-class guided missile heavy destroyer, =
generally similar to Sovremennyy-class ships and designed to provide =
sector air defense for the PLA=92s first-generation aircraft carrier =
battle group, which could materialize as early as 2003-2005.=20
Molniya Missile Gunboat=20
All the warships described above belong to 20th-century technology. Let =
us look next at 21st-century naval armaments. During the visit of Lt. =
Gen. Zhang Wannian to Russia in June 1999, China and Russia signed an =
agreement for joint development of a large group of "21st-century =
weapons,=94 including new-generation naval vessels. In October 1999, it =
became known that the two sides would jointly develop and test a =
"stealthy missile gunboat, with a combat potential equal to 2-3 =
destroyers.=94=20
Then, in early 2001 Russia began manufacturing the unique high-speed, =
low-observable (stealthy) Molniya missile gunboat, called a "small =
missile carrier of the 21st century=94 by foreign experts. This warship =
is produced mainly for export and China is its major customer. Said by =
experts to be unrivalled on the world arms market for the next 25 years, =
the Molniya is designed to destroy enemy surface ships and transport and =
landing vessels in coastal zones or on the open sea. This stealthy =
vessel carries four supersonic Moskit ASCMs and also has sophisticated =
anti-aircraft missiles and artillery armament. Its electronic equipment =
allows it to simultaneously track 15 targets and engage six of them.=20
The use of modern armament systems and high-speed propulsion enable this =
warship to control a sea area up to 5,000 square nautical miles. Its =
excellent sea-going qualities make it possible for the Molniya to fire =
its weapons in stormy weather (up to force-5 wind) and cruise safely in =
force-8 wind. This vessel, with a crew of 44, has a top speed of 38 =
knots and a cruising range of 2,400 nautical miles. Most important, the =
Molniya is several times cheaper than the Sovremennyy destroyer, while =
their combat potentials are said to be roughly comparable.=20
The Russian maker of the Molniya is not known for sure, but very likely =
it is Khabarovsk Shipyard, located near the Chinese border. This =
enterprise produces high-grade hydrofoil vessels for defense and =
civilian use and has some 10 years of experience in cooperation with =
China.=20
In June 2001, Rybinsk Shipyard (some 300 km northeast of Moscow) began =
producing the "export-oriented Skorpion missile craft,=94 equipped with =
Yakhont ASCMs, and =96 remarkably enough =96 claimed to be "much more =
advanced than the Molniya missile craft.=94=20
The authors cautiously estimate that by late 2002 PLAN could have up to =
six Molniya missile gunboats, both Chinese-made and Russian-made, and =
that the first of them may already have entered service in the PLAN by =
mid-2001. Conclusions=20
All the projects listed above were initiated or greatly accelerated =
after June 1999. In the two-plus years since then, PLAN modernization =
has demonstrated almost vertical progress. As a result, PLAN is becoming =
a dangerous adversary for U.S. Navy groups in East Asia and the Western =
Pacific. By late 2002 =96 a critical moment related to the generational =
shift in China=92s leaders =96 PLAN=92s combat potential will clearly be =
much more evident. Of course, Russian sales and technological assistance =
are the key elements in this rapid development.=20
The authors would also like to touch upon a few other Sino-Russian naval =
projects mentioned in their forthcoming book:=20
PLAN=92s conventional submarine fleet =96 about 60 on-duty vessels =96 =
will be upgraded and expanded by late 2002, mainly with the aid of =
Russian technology. The number of Russian-made Kilo-class and =
Chinese-made Super-Kilo-class "noiseless=94 submarines in PLAN=92s =
Northern Fleet, East China Sea Fleet, and South China Sea Fleet will =
rise from five by late 2000 to at least seven by mid-2002. Over this =
same period, Russian ship repair plants, especially the Zvezda Plant =
near Vladivostok, will upgrade at least 10 Chinese Ming- and Romeo-class =
conventional submarines, and possibly as many as 20-25, according to =
reports from the mid-July 2001 Jiang-Putin summit.=20
Thus, by the end of 2002 PLAN will have formed a battle group =96 =
including advanced and upgraded missile destroyers, missile frigates and =
conventional submarines =96 capable of accomplishing the major tasks of =
any Taiwan operation: sea blockade, followed by landings on Taiwan, and =
prevention of any U.S. Navy intervention on the side of Taiwan=92s Armed =
Forces.=20
Western experts love to point out that PLAN lacks amphibious transports =
for moving PLA troops across the Taiwan Strait. The point is that =
amphibious assaults (according to PLA strategists) are only the third =
stage of a Taiwan operation, after the air/sea blockade (first stage) =
and IRBM shower (second stage). When all or most of Taiwan=92s heavy =
weapons are wiped out and U.S. troops are interdicted hundreds of miles =
from the island, who will prevent the PLA from crossing the strait on =
transport vessels of all kinds =96 military and civilian? Finally, let =
us not forget about the Russian navy, especially its Pacific Fleet, =
whose role under the auspicious new environment of the Sino-Russian =
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation could be sinister enough.=20
While in Sevastopol on July 29, President Putin signed Russia's new =
naval doctrine, which calls for a Russian fleet to be present in all the =
world's oceans and creates a new maritime collegium within the =
government to oversee fleet operations. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief =
Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov stressed that the doctrine is destined to become =
a cornerstone of Russia's geopolitical strategy. Meanwhile, speaking at =
the ceremony on July 29 marking Russian Navy Day in Vladivostok, Defense =
Minister Sergey Ivanov said he will do "everything he can to restore the =
Russian Pacific Fleet" to its former glory, from its current sorry =
state.
